The paper utilises a novel career perspective to examine managerial theories of organisational control in the context of executive reward. Principal-agent theory, managerial power and neo-institutionalism are evaluated. Detailed career histories of boardroom executives in all FTSE350 companies between 1996 and 2008 are utilised. Using both a fixed effects panel and a career based approach, rival hypotheses are tested. In addition to the payperformance relationship, the probability of job loss as a function of performance is also estimated. The evidence presented points to the importance of institutional considerations in the standard agency theory and managerial power perspectives, and lends support to a social theory of agency. The analysis is empirical in nature and an effort is made to draw on qualitative studies to further flesh out the discussion. The practical implications of the findings point to the inadequacy of existing arrangements to deliver efficient pay outcomes where performance is poor whilst highlighting dangers of relying on naive policy remedies that ignore the role played by institutional forces in their implementation. Also highlighted is the distinct advantage of boards adopting a cumulative or career-oriented approach when evaluating executive performance. From a policy perspective, the case is made for truly long term incentives, in the form of 'Career Shares'.
INTRODUCTION
Currently there is a disconnect between pay and performance in UK boardrooms. While the public, in general, and business analysts, in particular, express disquiet regarding the level of executive remuneration, it is this apparent disconnect between company performance delivered and remuneration received that provokes most concern regarding the effectiveness of boards in securing value for money from executive directors (BIS, 2011; High Pay Commission, 2011; Hutton, 2010) . The paper moves away from the conventional year-on-year analysis of pay and performance to suggest that a richer insight can be obtained by using a cumulative or career-based perspective. This allows the role of corporate governance to be evaluated in a new light. In so doing, it provides support for the context-specific interpretation of agency theory as suggested by Bruce et al. (2005) ; Gomez-Mejia et al. (2005) ; Wiseman et al. (2012) . Table I illustrates just why some concern regarding a disconnect between pay and performance might well be justified. Using data introduced in detail below, the Table describes all executive director careers in the FTSE350 that start and end between 1996 and 2008. The top panel reports the distribution of total remuneration realised over these careers, both through direct cash payments and through gains realised from equity-linked long term incentives (options, performance share plans, etc.), all expressed in £2008m. Directors are then grouped according to whether their shareholders were better off (value creators) or worse off (value destroyers) at the end of the career period in question. It can be seen that the upper quartile of value destroyers receive a reward at least as great as the typical (median) value creating executive (£2.4m versus £2.0m). 1% of the value-destroying directors in our sample (21 directors) left the shareholders of their companies in a worse state than when they started, and yet took home in excess of £14.6m each. The data that underpin this Table are analysed in greater detail below.
Over last 10 years there has also been a clear disconnect at the market level. This is apparent, for example, through the lack of connection between the mean total CEO pay in the FTSE 100 and the annual variation in the FTSE 100 performance index (BIS, 2011, Fig 3, p11 ). This disconnect at market level is observed even after a concerted effort to reform corporate governance in the UK, as promulgated in a series of high profile reports on the topic (Cadbury, 1992; Greenbury, 1995; Hampel, 1998; Higgs, 2003; Walker, 2009 ) and codified in successive versions of the UK's Corporate Governance Code (FRC, 2010) and by the UK's financial regulatory authority (FSA, 2010) . Furthermore, there is ample evidence that executive contracts contain a high proportion of at-risk or performance-dependent pay (BIS, 2011, Fig 2, p9) . Indeed, qualitative studies of the remuneration decision process within boards generally paint a picture of well intentioned independent directors striving to craft remuneration arrangements that are both competitive in the executive market place and stretching in terms of performance linkages, e.g., Bender and Moir (2006) ; Clarke and Conyon (1998) ; Lincoln et al. (2006) ; Main et al. (2008) .
So where does the relationship break down? It could be that there is indeed a strong linkage between performance and remuneration, but that commentators observe and compare the outcomes in a way that masks this relationship. For example, pay may be observed in a particular year but the total remuneration realised pertains to performance over not only that particular year but also (thanks to long-term incentives) to performance over the previous three years.
Similarly, total remuneration as awarded is in part contingent on performance over the coming three years. However, the use of realised pay in a career framework, as presented in Table I and discussed in detail below, avoids such timing pitfalls and, yet, continues to reveal a major disconnect between pay and performance.
Such a disconnect not only offends the public's sense of fair play (High Pay Commission, 2011), but also runs contrary to a considerable body of management theory which predicts that at the top of large companies the linkage of pay to performance should emerge as an important tool of control over management behaviour (BIS, 2011; Core et al., 2003; Hutton, 2010) . The tension between the theoretically informed expectation and the observed empirical outcome invites a more careful consideration of the theoretical underpinnings of the link between corporate governance and directors' remuneration. In particular, there is scope to assess the balance of rival explanations of boardroom pay. The most direct of these is the principal-agent (Conyon et al., 2011; Core and Larcker, 2002; Fama and Jensen, 1983; Gomez-Mejia et al., 2005; Stathopoulous et al., 2005) or 'contractarian' (Davis, 2005) approach where non-executive directors are seen as the representatives of shareholders, acting, among other things, to ensure that remuneration arrangements are in the shareholders' interests. In policy circles this is usually alluded to under the 'pay for performance' label. Managerial power qualifies this perspective by highlighting the asymmetry of information and bounded rationality issues that raise the possibility of the process being captured by the incumbent management, who can then extract generous pay awards for themselves (Bebchuk et al., 2002) . From this perspective, the presence of outside directors emerges as a key consideration in ensuring that shareholders get a reasonable deal.
The situation is further complicated when consideration is given to the institutional context. This weighs heavily when non-executive directors, in seeking legitimacy for their decisions regarding executive pay, fall back on being seen to do the right thing. They do this by following the practice or guidance of others, while placing relatively little weight on designing pay to serve as an incentive in its own right (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; DiPrete and Eirich, 2010; Eisenhardt, 1988) . The field of directors' remuneration provides abundant examples that are consistent with such an explanation. When the ABI (ABI, 1987) suggested performance conditions be applied to the vesting of executive share options and provided as an example earnings per share (EPS) growth of inflation plus three percentage points, then suddenly the accepted market practice became targeting EPS growth of exactly 'RPI +3%'. Similarly, following Greenbury (1995) , the hitherto widespread use of three-year rolling contracts for boardroom executives quickly disappeared to be replaced by a near universal one-year contract. While the campaign for this change had been promoted for some time by the National Association of Pension Funds (NAPF) and spearheaded by Alastair Ross Goobey, a managerial power perspective might have predicted considerably more resistance than occurred once the Greenbury Report (Greenbury, 1995) had been published. In a similar fashion: the adoption of long term incentive plans in preference to share options that followed Greenbury (1995) ; the abandonment of re-testing of performance conditions on long term incentives (ABI, 1999) ; the move to having no award for less than median performance (ABI, 1999) , and so on, are innovations that were all quickly adopted with remarkably little push-back from boards or executive directors.
The two important contributions of the paper are that, first, by utilising a career perspective we offer a new lens through which to evaluate pay and performance relationships, thereby providing fresh insights into the working of theories of corporate governance. Second, by measuring remuneration in the form of realised pay, as opposed to pay awards, it avoids the ambiguities of timing and uncertainty that beset such complex remuneration arrangements, while offering a measure of reward that includes both cash or short term pay as well as the longer term equity-based pay that has come to play a major part in executive reward (BIS, 2011) . What results is a clear view of the extent to which non-executive representation on the board can be viewed as a mechanism of control over executive reward and, by extension, executive decision making in general. Overall, our results point to the importance of incorporating institutional considerations into the agency and managerial power explanations of board room activity. In this, our conclusions regarding executive director remuneration enforce those of Capezio et al. (2011) while using a wider and more robust measure of remuneration. In terms of theory development and policy implications, our findings resonate with DiPrete and Eirich (2010) and Wiseman et al. (2012) .
THE GOVERNANCE OF DIRECTOR REMUNERATION Theory
As explained above, much of the popular discussion of directors' remuneration centres around whether executives are being overpaid and whether shareholders are getting value for money from the top executive team. These are far from trivial concerns and have received consid-erable attention from scholars of management theory (Conyon et al., 2010; Core et al., 2003; Frydman and Jenter, 2010; Murphy, 1999) . There are, however, wider issues at stake. Pay is seen as a major control device in providing managers with incentives to take decisions that are in the shareholders interests (FSA, 2011, para592) . The obverse of this being that observed excess pay to executives can be taken as an indication of organisational slack (Wade et al., 2006) and rent extraction by the executives (Bebchuk and Spamann, 2010) .
In modern form, the identification of the control problem created by the separation of ownership and control, and the accompanying development of a professional management class, is generally attributed to Berle and Means (1932) , although the issue was highlighted earlier by Smith (1776) . The concept of using remuneration design to address the problem by linking pay with performance, and so aligning the interest of professional managers with those of the shareholders (Murphy, 1985) , emerges from the analysis of the widely-held corporation as outlined by Jensen and Meckling (1976) . This allows a pay mechanism to substitute for imperfections in the direct supervision of the top management team (Murphy, 1999 ) -imperfections that arise owing to bounded rationality (Simon, 1947) , asymmetric information (Akerlof, 1970) and information impactedness (Williamson et al., 1975) . The approach has been characterised by Roberts (2001) as viewing the employment relationship as comprising implicit and explicit contracts, and fits with the Alchian and Demsetz (1972) view of the firm as a nexus of contracts. This is a world of optimal contracting (Demsetz and Lehn, 1985; Hermalin and Weisbach, 2003) where enterprises 'set optimal equity incentive levels' (Core and Guay, 2002, p.151) This principal-agent or agency perspective on the management of enterprises with dispersed ownership quickly came to dominate policy discussions in the field of directors' remuneration, and is commonly expressed in the much used triplet: 'attract, retain and motivate' (Greenbury, 1995, para. 1.10) . In academic circles, modeling behaviour in this manner was found to be highly tractable (Grossman and Hart, 1983) , although early empirical testing was less than supportive, with the observed linkage between directors' remuneration and their respective company's performance being found to be empirically so modest as to challenge the notion that it could significantly influence decision making (Jensen and Murphy, 1990) . However, as time progressed, more aggressive use of long term share-based incentives in the boardroom (Murphy, 2002) meant that later empirical estimates of the incentive effect rose to levels that were more supportive of this perspective, and hence more able to explain directors' remuneration (Hall and Liebman, 1998) . By this time, the theoretical perspective had deepened to allow for the risk aversion of individual executives (Garen, 1994; Haubrich, 1994) , and empirical studies quickly incorporated this consideration to claim further support for the agency interpretation (Hall and Murphy, 2002; Lambert et al., 1991) . Growth in company size and scarce managerial talent has also been used to explain the recent marked rise in director remuneration (Edmans and Gabaix, 2009; Gabaix and Landier, 2008) .
The principal-agent framework soon came to be central to discussions of corporate governance: 'Executives and shareholders can have divergent interests, ...... Remuneration structures should seek to address this.' (ABI, 2011, para.v(c) ). The potential vulnerability of the process to being undermined by managerial or insider power (Bebchuk et al., 2002 ) imparts a heightened importance to the role of non-executive directors. As indicated above, the recent wave of reform of corporate governance in the UK is generally taken to date from the Cadbury Report (Cadbury, 1992) and, from the outset, the emphasis was on the inclusion and role of non-executive or independent directors (Cadbury, 1992, para. 4.6) . They are taken as the embodiment of shareholder interests. As such, it is on their shoulders that responsibility rests in terms of crafting reward arrangements such as to ensure executive directors see their own interests as aligned with those of the shareholders. Failure in this task due to abuse of managerial power is seen as leading to excess in executive director remuneration ('rewards for failure ' (BIS, 2011, p.22) being one manifestation). None of this, of course, rules out the role of non-executives in directly monitoring performance (as would, in any case, be a necessary part of any incentive pay scheme), or in providing general advice and counsel to the top management team (Westphal, 1999) . The non-executive directors themselves are assumed to strive for such successful outcomes out of their own career or reputational concerns (Yermack, 2004) or from a professional and altruistic drive to pass on the advantage of their experience to the next generation (Roberts et al., 2005) .
Although it has come to dominate policy discussions of directors' remuneration, the principal agent perspective of directors' remuneration as a designed incentive mechanism is not without its critics. Surveys of the large numbers of empirical studies in the area (Dalton et al., 2003; Devers et al., 2007; Tosi et al., 2000) find that estimates of the magnitude of the pay-performance relationship remain empirically modest. These findings, in the face of apparently continuously rising levels of reward (BIS, 2011; Hutton, 2010) , lend strength to alternative views of what determines executive remuneration -views that qualify the simple agency theory picture presented above. The two main qualifications arise in the form of managerial power (Pfeffer, 1981; Salancik and Pfeffer, 1977) and neo-institutionalism (Capezio et al., 2011; DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Scott, 1991) . As indicated above, managerial power sees the incumbent management (the executive directors) as exploiting their privileged position to extract generous levels of reward for themselves (Bebchuk and Fried, 2004) . The efforts of non-executive directors are needed to impose some discipline on this process which is otherwise undermined by the power or influence of the incumbent top management team (Bebchuk et al., 2002; Main et al., 1995) . Restraints, if any, arise from a desire to stay 'under the radar' (Bebchuk et al., 2002, p.16) , to avoid provoking 'outrage' (Bebchuk and Fried, 2004, p.64 ) among shareholders or commentators. In such a situation, the prevalence of non-executive directors is viewed as particularly important (Capezio et al., 2011; GregorySmith, 2011) . The Bebchuk critique of optimal contacting has been met by a spirited defence (Conyon, 2006; Core et al., 2004; Hall and Murphy, 2003) , but a meta analysis of 219 studies in the area of managerial power and executive remuneration (van Essen et al., 2012) finds that the prevalence of non-executive directors both lowers the level of CEO pay and increases the pay-performance sensitivity.
The neo-institutional perspective (Main et al., 2008; Tarbert et al., 2008) , places less faith in the prevalence of non-executive directors. It generally accepts that they are well-intentioned but, finding the design of executive director remuneration arrangements to be beset with ambiguity and asymmetry of information (Akerlof, 1970; Williamson et al., 1975) , and confronted by their own bounded rationality (Simon, 1947) , they are seen as reaching for certain shorthand solutions to the problem. In such situations, they may find legitimacy: through a 'mimetic' process of following the lead of what other boards are doing (Devers et al., 2007; DiPrete and Eirich, 2010; Porac et al., 1999; Zajac and Westphal, 1995) ; through a 'coercive' process of conforming to existing regulatory codes (Barreto and Baden-Fuller, 2006) ; or through a 'normative' process by drawing on their own experience-based standards as developed through service on other boards (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Meyer and Rowan, 1977; O'Reilly et al., 1988; Perkins and Hendry, 2005; Scott, 2001 ). In each case, what emerges is an isomorphism of practice whereby each board seems to follow what other boards are doing.
A driving consideration is legitimacy. This is a long way from the regular and periodic adjustment of the pay-performance relationship as envisioned in agency theory (Core and Guay, 1999; Core et al., 2003; Core and Larcker, 2002) . In fact, rather than exerting a restraining effect on the generosity or laxness of remuneration that abuse of managerial power threatens, a higher presence of non executives may impart a sense of legitimacy and lead to more generous not less generous pay awards (Eisenhardt, 1988; Main and Johnston, 1993; Westphal and Zajac, 1995) .
In addition to the question of remuneration, there is always present the accompanying question of continued employment. This distinction between the intensive margin and extensive margin has long been recognised (Blundell et al., 2011; Heckman, 1993) , and is no less important in the context of the demand for executive director services. Rather than more pay for better performance (the intensive margin), directors can face the prospect of job loss for poor performance (the extensive margin). Such binary outcomes (loss of employment versus continuing employment) have been studied at boardroom level (Conyon, 1998; Conyon and Florou, 2002; Gregory-Smith et al., 2009; Murphy, 1999; Weisbach, 1988 ) and a significant performance sensitivity is observed. Clearly, if managerial power is a serious consideration then it would be expected that this sensitivity would be enhanced where managerial power is reduced. Everything expressed above regarding the strength of the pay-performance sensitivity can be re-expressed in terms of the performance sensitivity of job terminations. Empirical results are more qualified here. Thus, Dahya et al. (2002) find that following the introduction of the Cadbury (Cadbury, 1992) reforms in corporate governance the likelihood of job termination is more sensitive to poor performance, while Dedman (2003) find no change in the relationship following these reforms. Reporting on the USA, Huson et al. (2001) also note a failure of the sensitivity to change over a similar period of improved governance. The prevalence of non-executive directors can also be expected to make job tenure more performance sensitive (Hermalin and Weisbach, 1998) and several papers find a significant relationship between the performance sensitivity of CEO exit and the balance of non-executives on the board (Gregory- Smith et al., 2009; Weisbach, 1988; Yermack, 1996) .
Hypotheses
From the principal-agent perspective on remuneration as a control mechanism, the observed connection between pay and performance should be empirically and statistically robustwhether companies succeed or fail. Our career perspective offers a new framework in which to test this well known hypothesis. It also allows us to generate some novel hypotheses on the topic. Starting with the conventional approach, we can hypothesise:
Hypothesis 1: The observed pay-performance sensitivity is empirically and statistically significant for successful and for unsuccessful companies.
Such a result should be even clearer in a career context where all the various performance related pay-outs are taken into account and the timing ambiguities are minimised (Gong, 
2010):
Hypothesis 2: The observed pay-performance sensitivity will be empirically larger when measured over a director's career when the effects of all long-term incentives can be attributed as compared to estimates derived from annual observations of remuneration and performance.
Whereas the principal-agent story regards the optimal board structure to be in place (Core et al., 2003; Demsetz and Lehn, 1985) , the managerial power perspective suggests that those boards with a greater degree of outsider scrutiny will be subject to less abuse of managerial power. Hence a greater preponderance of non-executives can be expected to lead to more effective pay-performance contracting with the executive directors, as the more prevalent are non-executive directors then the freer they will be from the influence of managerial power when they negotiate the reward arrangements. It, therefore, follows that we can hypothesise that, under the managerial power view, greater prevalence of non-executive directors should imply greater value for money for shareholders:
Hypothesis 3: At any point a director's career, for a given level of performance, the level of executive reward will be lower the greater is the proportion of non-executives on the board.
Continuing to adopt the managerial power view, the greater the prevalence of non-executives on the board then the more emphasis will be paid to pay for performance. Thus in terms of rate at which remuneration varies for a change in company performance:
Hypothesis 4: At any point a director's career, the correlation between remuneration earned and performance delivered will be higher the greater is the proportion of non-executives on the board.
In a similar sense when it comes to terminating the careers of executive directors, the managerial power perspective suggests that this should be more sensitive to performance (more likely to happen when things go wrong) the greater the prevalence of non-executives on the board. We can therefore hypothesise:
Hypothesis 5: The probability of seeing an executive director's career terminate in any year will be higher and will be more sensitive to performance in the presence of a greater proportion of non-executives on the board.
It is difficult to hone a specific hypothesis to test the neo-institutional perspective, but were reward to be much higher in the presence of a greater prevalence of non-executives then this could be taken as an outcome of the effective legitimacy that a greater prevalence of non-executives brings (Bender, 2004) . The same could be said for an observation of lower pay-performance sensitivity and performance-related career termination propensity.
The next section introduces the data used to test the hypotheses introduced above.
RESEARCH METHODS Data
The source of the executive remuneration data used in this study is a commercial provider, Manifest Information Services Ltd. This company has collected annual boardroom data on all FTSE350 companies since 1995. These data are particularly rich in detail. Not only are the cash payments of salary and annual bonus available, but so too are the details of all realised gains through longer term incentive schemes such as share options, performance share plans and so on. Personal details are available for each member of the board, in addition to their precise start and end dates of service, thereby permitting the board composition to be described at all times. Once a company is included in the sample frame, Manifest continues to collect data on the company, even if it leaves the FTSE350, until it is wound up or taken private. The Manifest data set used here extends through to 2008. For financial and accounting data, DataStream is utilised.
Measures
The focal measure of remuneration used aims to capture realised remuneration. This includes both cash payments in the form of salary and bonuses and also those gains realised from the equity-linked long-term incentives such as executive share options or performance share plans.
The only source of financial reward that is not captured arises from pension benefits, which are too imperfectly measured over the period to allow a consistent or credible treatment, here or in any other previous UK study in the area. The measure of reward used is labelled 'TDC' to represent total direct compensation. This starts with total cash compensation in the form of the director's salary plus other cash payments such as any annual bonus received during each year. To this is added the realised value of options and other equity based incentives exercised during that year. By focusing on realised remuneration rather than remuneration as awarded at grant date, it is possible to avoid the difficulty of calculating the expected value of share options or performance share plans, both of which are generally subject to quite complex performance conditions in the UK (Conyon and Murphy, 2000; Main, 2006) . This is not about what the board intended or wished should happen, but about what actually transpired -realised reward. Focusing on realised remuneration also goes to the heart of the debate, which concerns the effective link achieved between pay and performance. Adopting a career perspective ensures any relationship between pay and performance is not obscured by issues of timing wherein payments in one year actually refer, at least in part, to performance delivered over an earlier time (Gong, 2010) . All remuneration data are expressed in £2008.
The Manifest data base also reports on board membership and from this it is possible to compute the size of board ('Board') as reported in each company's Annual Report and Accounts, and the percentage of these members who are non-executive ('% NEDs'). For each executive the date of birth permits age in years ('Age') to be computed. The start and end dates of boardroom service are also recorded by Manifest and this is used to compute each executive's length of service in years as of the end of each financial year ('Tenure').
Additional company descriptive data are obtained from DataStream. As a control for company size, the logarithm of total sales is used ('Sales'). Firm performance is primarily captured by total shareholder return over the period in question (this reflects the return to holding the share that arises both from dividend payments and changes in the price of the share). This is available through the 'RI' index available in DataStream, where the start and end value of the index is defined by the start and end of the relevant financial year or the start or end of the executive's career, when this occurs part way through a financial year. In order to express the shareholder return as the total change in shareholder wealth, it is possible to use the average total market capitalisation as reported in the 'MV' measure in DataStream. All financial data are expressed in £2008. Summary statistics are presented in Table I .
Insert Table I: Career and Annual Summary Statistics
The upper panel in Table I presents the descriptive statistics for Table I . In the middle part of Table I , the career data is utilised to provide an insight into the extent of the disconnect between pay and performance by separating out 'value-creators' (those directors where the shareholder of the respective company is better off at the end of the career than at the start) from 'value destroyers' (those whose shareholders are worse off at the end of the career than at the start). It has already been pointed out that the median wealth-creating director realises a career reward of £2.1m that is lower than the £2.4m received by the upper quartile value destroyer. In effect, 25% of the value-destroying executives earn more than the median of the value-creating executives.
The histogram in Figure 1 makes use of these data on FTSE350 executive careers to contrast the distribution of total remuneration enjoyed over each of these careers (in 2008£m) with the performance of each executive's respective company over the same period (measured as total shareholder return). While the highest paid director in the sample ('HPD') can be seen to both be richly rewarded and to deliver a high level of return to shareholders, the same cannot be said for the other two illustrative examples in Figure 1 (labelled 'Banker 1' and 'Banker 2'). There is an unambiguous "heads-I-win" and "tails-you-lose" aspect (Sanders, 2001 ) about these results. Pay is right skewed -at worst, the career is brief and only moderately rewarding, but at best it can be long and richly rewarding. On the other hand, shareholder returns over these same careers are markedly more symmetric -while shareholders can gain much, they also stand to lose it all, with past gains being easily swept away. Conyon and Murphy (2000) produced an estimate of 0.12 (as opposed to 0.27 for the USA).
Separating the data into value-creators and value-destroyers, demonstrates that there is an asymmetry in that the pay-performance sensitivity is significantly greater for value-creators, with the connection for value destroyers being empirically more modest. This asymmetry of treatment has been noted by Ezzamel and Watson (2002) and by Guest (2010) . For value creators, the career estimate of 0.170 indicates that by achieving a doubling of the increase in shareholder wealth over their career the executives will be 17% better off. At the median, producing an extra £304m in shareholder wealth results in an extra £368k on top of £2.1m career earnings. On the other hand, for value destroyers the downside is less bleak. If instead of merely destroying half of shareholder value (median return of value destroyers is -70.8%) a full three quarters of value destroyed, the executives see their career reward fall from £1.31m to £1.23m. While the former is consistent with prior estimates and empirically may be high enough to sustain an agency perspective on arrangements, the downside picture points towards rejection of Hypothesis 1.
The contrast between the upper and lower parts of Table II also reveals that the Career perspective presents a more modest pay-performance connection for all concerned. Using annual data allows previous poor years to be discounted, and presents a more sanguine picture of the pay-performance sensitivity than is justified from a career perspective. The advantage of the cumulative or career approach is that the ambiguities of timing are avoided (Gong, 2010) but the empirical estimates lead to a rejection of Hypothesis 2 and raise questions regarding the 'optimal contracting' perspective.
In all formulations presented in Table II , a larger size of board increases reward, and a higher percentage of non-executives also increases the reward. These are statistically significant results and run contrary to the predictions of managerial power, while remaining consistent with neo-institutional theory (as the larger and more non-executive dominated board feels greater legitimacy in awarding generous pay awards). These results reject Hypothesis 3 and suggest that, consistent with neo-institutional theory, there may be a legitimacy effect at work here as the greater the conformance with governance codes (in terms of external representation on the board) the more secure the board feels in designing highly remunerating reward arrangements. 
Insert

Cumulative pay performance elasticities
The role of cumulative pay is further investigated in the pay regressions of Table III . Here, rather than the career total or annual observation of pay (as in Table II), the cumulative record of each director is examined as at the end of each year of that director's career. This is the picture that would emerge if the remuneration committee incorporated all of the director's record to date when judging pay and performance. Once again, a marked and statistically significant difference in outcomes is observed between the value-creators and the value-destroyers. For value creators an elasticity with respect to cumulative performance of 0.19 is observed. For the value-destroyers the effect fails to reach statistical significance -enforcing the impression gathered from the descriptive statistics discussed above -that of a world of 'heads I win and tails you lose'.
As before, and consistent with the conclusions already drawn regarding Hypothesis 3, the larger the board and the higher the proportion of non-executives on that board the greater the level of realised pay. In addition, the interaction term between the % NEDs and the cumulative TSR is significant in all cases, suggesting that the pay performance sensitivity is higher for boards with a higher proportion of non-executives. Thus, not only does a greater presence non-executives increase the level of remuneration but it also heightens the pay-performance sensitivity -for both value creators and value destroyers. Such a result is consistent with agency theory whereby the executive is offered a higher expected level of reward in return for accepting a greater degree of pay at risk (Aggarwal and Samwick, 1999) . This could also be consistent with the isomorphism in practice that neo-institutional theory predicts. Under the neo-institutional view, the higher the prevalence of non-executives then the greater will be the pressure to act as other boards, and pressure to tie reward to performance will be more forcefully put into practice -possibly aided by remuneration consultants who spread 'best practice' (Conyon et al., 2010) . These interactions are plotted in Figure 3 , where it can be seen that the pay-performance elasticity is increasing in %NEDs but always higher for value-creators than for value-destroyers.
The evidence here makes it impossible to reject Hypothesis 4. The managerial power interpretation would predict that a greater preponderance of non-executives would leave the board better able to craft a reward arrangement that leaves the executive directors facing a high pay-performance sensitivity.
Insert Table III 
Probability of career exit
Of course, the principal-agent control effect of higher representation of non-executives could be manifesting itself in the extensive form of the employment relationship, that is, through career termination. To pursue this possibility, a probit estimation is reported in Table IV . In addition to person and company-specific control variables, the level of cumulative reward paid to date is included. As before, separating the sample into value-creators and value-destroyers is statistically justified, but fails to reveal any significant role for non-executives -either in their number, through the size of the board, or through their proportional representation on the board. There is a significant performance relationship, with those directors currently performing better being less likely to lose their post. Interestingly, for value-destroyers the cumulative record of performance also weighs significantly -so that current poor performance can be offset by a previous good record. This suggests an accumulated reservoir of goodwill or credibility is an important feature in determining termination decisions.
However, there is no significant role observed for board size or the proportion on nonexecutives. This remains true when an interaction term in introduced between %NEDs and TSR. This evidence indicates that Hypothesis 5 can be rejected. The expected role of nonexecutives in enhancing the extensive aspect of the pay performance relation (having one's career terminated for poor performance) is not observed. Even when the interacted with the (significant) company performance variable ('TSR'), the proportion of non-executives on the board fails to demonstrate any significance. 
Insert
DISCUSSION
Summary of Findings
Using a large sample of executive director careers that are observed between 1996 and 2008, it has been shown that in a substantial proportion of cases there is a clear disconnect between pay and performance. Analysis reveals that the pay performance elasticity that lies at the heart of the principal agent perspective is empirically more modest than conventional analysis suggests. By adopting a career perspective, it is shown that the pay to performance sensitivity is significantly lower than estimates based on annual observations suggest. This is particularly the case for those directors whom we label value-destroyers (because they leave shareholders worse off at the end of their career than at the beginning). These results are obtained using a wide measure of remuneration that includes the effects of long term incentives such as executive share options and performance shares. To avoid ambiguities regarding expected values, realised evaluations of remuneration are utilised. More importantly, the use of realised values speaks directly to the public debate in this area which concerns the wide perception of a disconnect between performance achieved and remuneration actually received (BIS, 2011; High Pay Commission, 2011; Hutton, 2010) . The debate centres around realised remuneration.
Far from exercising a restraining influence on pay, the presence of non-executive directors is seen to enhance the level of reward -whether measured on a career basis or annually. Exploring the promise of a more integrative perspective on pay and performance, analysis of cumulative remuneration as a function of cumulative performance is shown to be successful in revealing the difference in pay-performance alignment between the value-creators and the value-destroyers. The level and proportion of non-executives are, once again, sources of higher not lower levels of remuneration. It is demonstrated in this context, however, that the presence of non-executives does significantly enhance the pay-performance elasticity for executive directors.
Analysis of the length of executive director careers and the probability of dismissal finds that, consistent with much of the literature, poor performance does lead to dismissal. While the exit probabilities of value-creating directors depend only on contemporaneous performance, for value-destroyers the cumulative record performance also plays a role, suggesting that there is some institutional memory that mitigates current performance in the light of past success.
But the presence of non-executive directors does not sharpen the performance sensitivity of exit -not even when allowing for an interaction with performance.
Contribution of the Study
The contribution of the study is to offer a new and more robust framework in which to scrutinise the observed pay and performance of executive directors from the perspective of rival theories of management control. The novelty arises because rather than focusing on an annual, year-by-year, set of observations of director remuneration, a whole-career approach is adopted. This avoids the problem of which elements of remuneration to include (particularly acute when dealing with long-term incentives). The resulting observations summarize the job performed by the board in overseeing the reward aspects of the director's career. A second source of novelty is that the study utilises realised pay. This is an outcomes-based measure that avoids the problem of estimating expected outcomes -a problem that arises when awarded remuneration is utilised and which has become increasingly acute with the advent in the UK of markedly more idiosyncratic relative performance criteria, where the exact compo-sition of the comparator peer group can vary from company to company and, indeed, from time period to time period. Realised pay avoids such measurement complexities by simply recording the outcomes enjoyed (or not) by the executive. As a measure, it speaks directly to current policy concerns in this area (BIS, 2011; High Pay Commission, 2011; Hutton, 2010) .
By minimising any potential mismatch between observed remuneration and performance, and by avoiding the complexities of valuation that normally beset work in this area, this study provides a more revealing focus on the key issue in management theory of how good a job the board does in shaping the remuneration arrangements of the executive directors. The resulting observations suggest that the pay-performance connection is weaker than alternative perspectives suggest. The observed impact of non-executive directors seems to accord more with an neo-institutional explanation of their role than that put forward by principal agent theory or managerial power. The implications of these findings are discussed in some detail below.
Implications for Theory and Practice
One approach to reducing the potential for a disconnect between pay and performance of the type documented above, would be to prevent executives from cashing-out long-term incentives and thereby enjoying the rewards of early success before shareholders can be assured that any improvement in performance is not transient. To this end, we argue that all vested long-term incentive rewards should be held in company shares ('Career Shares', see Bebchuk and Fried (2010) ; Bhagat and Romano (2009); Main (2011); ) until the executive leaves the board -and possibly for a year or so longer, so ensuring the succession process is successful. This would engineer an automatic cumulative perspective to reward.
Those achieving high performance early in their career would have their feet held to the fire throughout the remainder of their time in office as the later share price impacts on the value of their reward. Those who underperform in that later period would experience an automatic settling-up or claw-back as a faltering share price reduces their reward. On the other hand, initially hesitant or slow beginnings are quickly forgiven as a later high performing share price lifts the value of all rewards. All of this occurs automatically.
The results presented above make clear the extent of the 'heads I win, tails you lose' (Sanders, 2001 ) type of outcome that has arisen in the area of director's remuneration. By adopting a career perspective we demonstrate that the achieved pay-performance sensitivity is more modest than it might appear from simply examining annual outcomes. For the class of valuedestroyers it is particularly weak, and yet their rewards remain significant -something that is distinctly at odds with principal-agent theory. The presence of non-executive directors seems to add a sense of legitimacy (in terms of high levels of remuneration) and, although there is evidence of a higher pay-performance sensitivity in terms of cumulative reward, non-executives seem to have no significant impact on the probability of career termination. This combination of findings points to a board better described by the mimetic behaviour of neo-institutional theory than in terms of the mechanism-design portrait offered by agency theory. In the words of (Perkins and Hendry, 2005, p.1464) , 'what matters is how rewards appear, not whether performance is being objectively overvalued'. If this is true, then it may be more effective to devise policy aimed at remuneration design rather than simply attacking the remuneration quantum.
This focus on the design of remuneration has a two-fold advantage in policy terms. First, although many commentators (Hutton, 2010) see the reforms in corporate governance over the last two decades as having brought no relief from a seemingly remorseless rise in executive remuneration, the UK has enjoyed one marked success in this field. The composition of executive reward has been radically re-defined and re-shaped under pressure from institutional investors. This influence of institutional investors is most visibly apparent in the Guidelines of the Association of British Insurers (ABI, 1987 (ABI, , 2011 , which have marked some quite major transformations in the way executive remuneration arrangements are shaped. Examples include: the increased ceiling on option grants; the switch to performance share plans ('Long Term Incentive Plans') from options; the abandonment of the 're-testing' of performance con-ditions; the introduction of peer groups and relative performance; the move away from 'cliff vesting'; the imposition of zero payout for below median performance; and so on. It is possible to be critical of some of these developments (Main, 2006) , but impossible to deny their impact. Effective strategy in any field should always build on what is achievable -proximate objectives as opposed to mistaking goals for strategy (Rumelt, 2011 ). While impacting on the level of remuneration may have proved elusive, there is no denying the effectiveness of UK institutions in shaping the structure of reward. In this sense, a move to 'Career Shares' is entirely achievable, as has been explained above and discussed in detail elsewhere (Bebchuk and Fried, 2010; Bhagat and Romano, 2009; .
The second advantage to focusing on design is that such an approach is robust against the prisoner's dilemma problem that besets decisions on director pay (Main, 2011; Pepper, 2006) .
When deciding on a quantum of pay, the board all too often finds the dominant strategy is to err on the generous side. Being generous when other companies are being generous is rational, if only to pay the 'going rate'. Being generous in a world where no one else follows represents a modest (in a large company) extra expense, but results in a top management team who feel valued and pyschologically more disposed to reciprocate with a consummate level of cooperation to shareholder benefit (Dabos and Rousseau, 2004; Fehr et al., 1997) . On the other hand, restraining pay brings only negative consequences. At best, the company matches the market, but there is a chance of underestimating the market. Underestimating the market (underpaying), in a world of increased transparency (DTI, 2002) , results in the prospect that the top management team will experience disruptive unplanned exits as people move to better paying jobs or, at the very least, become disaffected and demoralised, regarding themselves as being undervalued (Gregory-Smith and Main, 2011) .
The results presented in Tables I through IV suggest that theorising around the operations of the company board might be more fruitful if there were more attention paid to institutional influences and perhaps less concentration on unadorned agency theory modeling. As has been demonstrated here, policy prescriptions aimed at repairing the relationship between company performance and director remuneration promise to gain more traction if an institutionally richer perspective is developed.
Limitations and Areas for Further Research
As with any study that utilises panel data, there is always a sense that more could have been gained with a longer time series of data. The time series here ran out in 2008 and an obvious pointer for further research is to ask what happens in the subsequent recession. There must also be an important role to be played by further qualitative work in this field. The institutional perspective portrayed above relies, perforce, on the interpretation of certain key variables -essentially the size of the board and the proportion who are non-executive. There remains considerable scope for qualitative studies centred around the workings of the board and of the remuneration committee in particular. There is an existing kernel of work in this area, e.g., Bender (2003) ; Lincoln et al. (2006) ; Main et al. ( , 2008 ; Ogden and Watson (2008) , but more remains to be done.
Summary
Taking its inspiration from the Sanders (2001) observation that executive remuneration has about it an aspect of 'heads I win, tails you lose', this paper documents the particular failure of boards to tie the fortunes of their executive directors to the experience endured by their shareholders. It does so while using a robust measure of remuneration (realised remuneration) and in a setting (the director career) that minimises timing issues. The observed association of larger boards and greater proportions of non-executives with higher levels of realised executive remuneration raises a question over the relevance of managerial power approach in this area.
While it is necessary to guard against falling back on an 'over socialized' (Granovetter, 1985) view of boardroom activity, it does seem that policy in the area might be better designed if took account of the mimetic behaviour of non-executive directors. In so doing it could go with the grain of observed action by introducing 'career shares' in much the same way as institutional pressure led to the widespread adoption of long term incentive plans (Ltips) following the Greenbury Report (Greenbury, 1995; Main et al., 2008 ).
This does not imply an outright rejection of agency theory. As Wiseman et al. (2012) makes clear, one can accept the basic premise of this approach (individuals with an interest in an enterprise may have divergent aspirations) while allowing for the particular social setting in which the action is taking place. In discussing institutional influences on executive pay, DiPrete and Eirich (2010) invoke the Coleman (1986) macro-to-micro and micro-to-macro distinction to argue that good governance can produce higher not lower levels of executive reward. In the present context, the argument would be that encouraging boards to take on significant numbers of non-executives and emphasising that these non-executives should follow clear and transparent processes when they determine executive remuneration (macro-to-micro) may result in mimetic decision making that ends up ratcheting executive pay upwards, as each company strives to keep up with the market. If, for the prisoners dilemma reasoning explained above, each enterprise is keen not to be caught on the less generous side then the result is an upward ratcheting of rewards (micro-to-macro). The argument is made above that in such a situation it may be more effective to make use of the mimetic process to encourage the adoption of genuinely long terms reward mechanisms such as 'career shares', which will at least do something to ensure that value destroyers are not as generously remunerated as is currently the case. is measured as the difference in the director's company's logged Datastream return index taken at the start of their career and at the end of their career. The annual calculation of is simply the annual difference in the log of the return index.
is multiplied by the average Market Capitalisation over the director's career to give Δ ℎ ℎ ℎ ( ) (or the market cap at the year end for the annual statistic). 3. TDC realised is total compensation realised over the whole career, in Dec 2008 £M. This includes salary, bonuses, perks and the realised values from share options, deferred bonuses and vested equity incentives. This is our preferred measure of pay when analysing the efficiency of the remuneration contract over the director's career. 4. The comprise (turnover in Dec 2008 £M), (no. of directors at the year end), % (the percentage of the board comprising non-executive directors at the year end), (the age of the director at the year end) and (the directors' tenure to date measured in years). For the career panel, the average value over the directors' tenure was taken. 1. The first panel estimates the pay-performance elasticity on a career basis. The dependent variable is the logged value of career TDC realised and is measured as the difference in the director's company's logged return index taken at the start of their career and at the end of their career. The second panel estimates the pay-performance elasticity on an annual basis, again using a realised measure of TDC (for comparability the realised measure is presented here, but qualitatively similar results were obtained using a grant date based measure, results available on request). 2. The benefit of including a career perspective can be seen by contrasting the career-based elasticities with those which result from a year-on-year approach. Under the latter approach, the estimated pay-performance sensitivity on the full sample appears as 0.11, versus 0.06 in the career estimates. 3. The asymmetric test column tests whether pay is more sensitive to performance when the performance is positive.
+ is TSR when TSR>0. This variable is positive, suggesting the relationship between pay and performance is stronger when TSR is positive. Further, when this variable is included with the career estimates, the coefficient on returns as insignificantly different from zero. This suggests that on a career basis, a director who destroys more value than her counterpart experiences no financial penalty relative to her counterpart. 4. In addition to the controls reported above, industry and time dummies were included in the estimating equations. The industry dummies (and the tenure variable) were omitted in the annual panel as these are eliminated in the fixed effects regression. Likewise, the age variable merely captures the within director time trend and hence was omitted from the annual panel. is cumulative TSR, which measures the log difference in the return index starting at the director's appointment date and ending at each year end until their exit.
‡ interacts with the average % to the year end. This allows us to capture the potential increase in pay-performance sensitivity imposed by boards with a greater proportion of board directors. Best practice introduced during the period has encouraged a steady increase in both non-executive membership on the board and pay-performance sensitivity (PPS). As such there is a time component to the relationship between % and PPS. Nevertheless, the table above explicitly controls for this time component with year dummies (output omitted) in addition to the director tenure variable. is the log of cumulative TDC realised. This captures the emerging connection between pay and the likelihood of exit. Directors who have accumulated more during their tenure to date, are more likely to exit. The difference is greater for the value destroyers but the difference is not statistically significant (Wald test post biprobit in Stata 11 ( 2 =0.67). The equivalent coefficient for column 1 if using log annual TDC realised is .066*** 2 is cumulative TSR. The expected inverse relationship between exit likelihood and performance is found and this is stronger for the value destroyers. Here the difference is statistically significant ( 2 =52.92). The ‡ interacts TSR with % and is not significant suggesting more non-executives do not tighten exit-performance relationship, rejecting H5. .4 .5 .6 .7 % Non−executive directors
All directors
Value Creators Value Destroyers 1. % is the percentage of non-executive directors that served on the board during the financial year, excluding the chairman. Best practice introduced during the period has encouraged a steady increase in both non-executive membership on the board and pay-performance sensitivity (PPS). As such there is a time component to the relationship between % and PPS. Nevertheless, the graph above explicitly controls for this time component with year dummies and a variable capturing the length of the directors tenure (see table III ) 2. Excludes careers commencing prior to 1st January 1996 3. Careers less than 2 years dropped
